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Abstract 
The purpose of present study is to explore theoretically and empirically the impact of 
counterterrorism effectiveness on economic growth of Pakistan. The data for counter-terrorism 
components construct from GTD and data for growth variables gathered from WDI for the time 
1980 to 2015. This study developed “negative binomial regression model” for investigating the 
magnitude and significance of counter-terrorism effectiveness. It also uses the ARDL bound test 
and causality analysis for examining the causal relationship between economic growth and 
counter-terrorism effectiveness. This study further identifies that there are three types of 
proactive strategies used by Government and military authorities to reduce violence: civilian 
policies, peace accords and military operations. The result shows that there are long term impacts 
of counter-terrorism policies on economic growth. The findings also imply that counter-terrorism 
strategies may not be able to restrict violence and incapacitate militant‟s organization and their 
sleeper cell if it lacks strong political support. The present work is raw evidence for the effort 
level of authorities and their preemptive strategies that leads to the significant breakdown effect 
to curb terrorism across the country. 
Keywords: Counterterrorism: Causality: Military operations: Negative binomial 
JEL Classification: K42, O10, Z10 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Pakistan has accommodated millions of refugees entering in country and supported the war in 
Afghanistan against Taliban. The militant insurgency has fallen over to FATA (Federally 
Administrated Tribal Areas), contiguous to Afghanistan and regularly threating the adjoining 
areas of KPK (Khyber Pakhtoun Khawan) and being a cause of irregular acts of violence in the 
rest of Pakistan. From the last three decades, the involvement in the war against terrorism, 
Pakistan facing a drastic conflict among different factions that spontaneously fluctuate its 
economic growth. 
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Due to asymmetric violence and domestic conflicts, Pakistan has been graded second most 
affected country amongst countries (Global Terrorism Index, 2012). Over the past decades, 
Pakistan have used up huge amount of expenditures in implementing and designing the great 
number of policies to counter terrorism. There was 25% reduction in victims and 7% reduction in 
terrorist incidence in Pakistan from 2013 to 2014 (Global Terrorism Index, 2015). In 2016, there 
was 27% reduction in terrorist incidence and 12% reduction count in deaths (U.S Country Report 
on Terrorism, 2016). Evidently, the assessment of proactive counter-terrorism measures and 
policies needs more exploration to investigate whether the granted amount of resources on 
counter-terrorism are beneficial. Additionally, the capacity of antiterrorism spending has raise 
considerably overtime, exclusively after 9/11. The public cost of counter-terrorism and terrorism 
policies yields more than fifty thousand (50,000) victims, containing 15,700 military personnel 
and 118.32$ billions of monetary costs from Pakistan‟s economy since 9/11 (Pakistan Economic 
Survey, 2016).  
The broader objective of this study is to test empirically the significance and magnitude 
of counter-terrorism effectiveness over time in reducing terrorism. Then, it also examines the 
policies and efforts made by the Government of Pakistan and Military authorities towards 
counter-terrorism. In addition, it investigates the impact of counter-terrorism effectiveness on 
economic growth and explains whether counter-terrorism effectiveness has an impact on 
economic growth or not. This study develops the magnitude and significance of counter-
terrorism effectiveness by using “Negative Binomial Regression Model”. On the flip side, it‟s 
also investigated “ARDL model” and “Granger Causality” test for empirically check out the 
relationship between economic growth and counter-terrorism effectiveness. 
 
Figure 1.1: Percentage of Victims of Terrorism in Pakistan 
Source: Global Terrorism Database (1980-2015)  
In addition, this study adds short run and long run relationship between counter-terrorism 
effectiveness and economic growth. The counter-terrorism has an impact on number of victims 
whether the numbers of victims increase or decrease. In econometric model, the present study 
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also accounted to explain three types of counter-terrorism effects, deterrence effect which is 
explains through military expenditures, GDP (per capita) and regime type. Accordingly, 
retaliation effect shows with total number of terrorist attacks which also explains the efforts level 
of militants. It is expected that both deterrence and retaliation effect tends to decrease number of 
terrorist attacks across the country. To this end, this study has developed the information 
delivered by the GTD
4
 (Global Terrorism Database), which categories the terrorism incidents in 
various classifications. GTD provided detail of 11928 terrorist incidents from 1980 to 2015. 
Nevertheless, economic growth is proxies by main variable GDP (per capita).  
1.1 Counter-terrorism Policies and Strategies of Pakistan 
Government of Pakistan has established several proactive
5
 and defensive anti-terrorism measures 
to discourage and de-radicalized terrorist organizations. Pakistan had commenced just two 
operations of counterinsurgency against separatist of Karachi in 1992 and tribal militants of 
Baluchistan in 1974 before 9/11. The coinciding increased in terrorist attacks and operations of 
counterinsurgency around the country of dispute management policies appropriated by 
Government and military authorities to reduce violence after 9/11. According to the relevant 
literature on counterinsurgency and crime, there are three endorsements related to policies of the 
counter-terrorism effectiveness in empirical and theoretical analysis, respectively mentioned 
below in details (Landes, 1978; Rosendorff and Sandler 2010; Rehman et al., 2017).  
I. Deterrence Effect 
The first endorsement analyses the deterrence effect of counter-terrorism measures, which is 
link with cost of affecting a terrorist attack. The major deterrence effects against violence 
measured by the military expenditures and number of policies (Barros, 2003). Likewise, anti-
terrorist acts can deter violence by striking severe punishment on imprisoned terrorist. Therefore, 
measures that support to upturn the likelihood of apprehension and principle can lower the 
terrorist activities (Landes, 1978). 
Anti-Terrorism Acts (1952-2012)  
The government authorities of Pakistan proposed number of security and anti-terrorism 
acts since 1952. Those acts particularly reinforce provisions making the offence of violence 
financing, casing all the features of the offence in the light of worldwide ethics and offers for 
more effective actions for law-enforcement organizations to explore the offences. The approved 
acts and bills by the government are “Security of Pakistan Act 1952”, “Prevention of Anti-
National Activities 1974”, “Prohibition of Private Armies Act 1974”, “Anti-Terrorism Act 
1997”, “Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority Ordinance 2001”, “National Command 
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Authority Act 2010” and “Anti-terrorism (Amendment) Bill 2012”. These approved laws have 
endorsed possibly overtime, as the first parliamentary deterrence. 
Peace Accords (2005-2009) 
Pakistan has deterred the militants of South and North Waziristan agencies and Malakand 
division by signing peace agreements. The included signed accords are; Shakai agreement 
(2004) in Gen. Musharraf era with Commander of Taliban Nek Muhammad in South Waziristan, 
Sararogha Peace Deal (2005) signed with Baitullah Mehsud pro-Taliban militant in South 
Waziristan agency after the death of Nek Muhammad, Miranshah Peace Accord (2006) with the 
militant of North Waziristan, Mohid-e-Sarorah agreement signed with Abdullah Mehsud, Swat 
agreement (2009) with Mullah Fazullah vice Commander of TTP. Nevertheless, all these peace 
accords have all proven useless. 
II. Retaliation Effect 
Retaliation effects measures the second proposition which explains that some anti-terrorist 
activities and military operation against militants may upturn the number of terrorist attacks in 
future, number of victims, property losses and repression. Actions that raise the cost of anti-
terrorist activities can motivate violence and outcome in what is termed backlash or retaliation 
effect (Siqueira and Sandler, 2007; Schelling, 1980; Rosendorff and Sandler, 2010). According 
to Dutter and Seliktar (2007), an increase in the number of casualities is an evidence that terrorist 
organizations are failed to attack on hard target, so they chosed to attack on soft targets that may 
easier to find.  
III. Breakdown Effect 
By directing the resources legacies of militants and incapacitate them to inauguration future 
attacks. For instance, government can use proactive strategies by deploying military to terminate 
 
Figure 1.2:  Total Percentage of Attack types of Terrorist Incidence in Pakistan 
Source: Global Terrorism Database (2015) 
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Terrorist network across the country and reduce the resources legacies of the rebel groups. Any 
preemptive strategy that reduces terrorist activities and attacks by decreasing their resources is 
incapacitation or Breakdown effect (Rehman et al., 2017). Further, the breakdown effect has 
measured by counter-insurgent and domestic operations by military authorities. The gathered 
information on carrot-and-stick counter-terrorism strategies and operations across the country by 
military stated below. 
 National Internal Security Policy (NISP 2014-2018) 
The first-ever “National Internal Security Policy6 (NISP)” has been exposed by the 
Government of Pakistan after 67 years of Independence. The three main objectives of NISP 
includes, negotiation with all shareholders, separation of terrorist from their funding system and 
deterrence augmentation by capacity structure of the security gear to deactivate threats of inside 
security of Pakistan. For implementing the aims of NISP, all the security and law enforcement 
agencies works together under Counter-Terrorism Departments (CTDs). 
 National Action Plan (NAP)  
Political and military authorities of Pakistan have learned from previous counterinsurgency 
strategies that undertaking the control of one region does not reduce the terrorist attacks and 
provide deterrence. In response of counterinsurgency operations, the well-established militants 
move their networks from one place to another. Therefore, the new inclusive counterinsurgency 
strategy implemented by Government in January 2015 was “National Action Plan”. The plan was 
hallmark of on ongoing operation Zarb-e-Azb in NWA (North Waziristan Agency). It was 
addressed as a main coordinated state revenge following the backlash attack of militants on army 
public school Peshawar in December 2014. Both NAP and Operation Zarb-e-Azb are the solid 
evidence of counter-terrorism effectiveness in reducing terrorist attacks on significant level 
(Rehman et al., 2017). 
Military Operations (2001-2016)  
The Pakistan Military Forces has been engaged in confirming internal stability and 
security through tackling militancy and insurgency in FATA (Federally Administered Tribal 
Areas), the PATA (Provincially Administered Tribal Areas) and across the country since 2001 
(Khan, Z.A., 2012). In order to look challenges, Pakistan army has decided to bring variations in 
its motivation, orientation, strategies and thinking from the last sixteen years. In this regard, 
military has conducted seven major operations along with various smaller operations against the 
terrorists and insurgents. Finally, the study analyzes briefly the military operations launched by 
Pakistan Army. 
 
                                                          
6
 The NISP cannot achieve its goals without active participation of Provincial Governments/Police in the NISP 
implementation process. 
  
6 
 
 Operation Enduring Freedom (2001-2002) 
To some extent, it was a successful operation in its purposes of overthrowing the Terrorists 
regime and arrested some followers of Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan (Khan, Z.A., 2012). However, 
both Pakistan and United States forces futile to arrest main leaders of Al-Qaeda. 
0
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Figure 1.3: Total Number of Terrorist Incidents in Pakistan 
Source: Global Terrorism Database (1980-2015) 
 Operation Al-Mizaan (2002-2006) 
This Operation was conducted against the foreign militants in FATA under the compression of 
Washington (Khan, Z.A., 2012). It was contained various smaller operations, like Operation 
Kalosha-II in Waziristan. For this operation, government deploys frontier forces in between 
70,000 to 80,000 in FATA (PIPS, 2016). 
 Operation Zalzala (2008) 
The Sararogha fort was captured by the men of Baitullah Mehsud in South Waziristan agency 
and killed security personnel of Pakistan army (Khan, Z.A., 2012). The Pakistan Military forces 
launched three main operations against TTP (Baitullah Mehsud) after the failure of Sararogha 
Peace deal. Operation Zalzala (Earthquake) was the main component and security forces cleared 
most area of South Waziristan and interrupted some strategic suicide attacks. It was successful 
operation of Pakistan army (Khan, Z.A., 2012). 
 Operation Rah-e-Haq (2007-2009) 
At the request of provisional government Operation Rah-e-Haq was conducted with the prime 
objective of „Shoot-on-sight” and curfews in main areas of Swat valley against major groups of 
militants. It was comprised on three phases which lauched respectively from (2007-2009). And 
the battle ended with Malakand accord (Khan, Z.A., 2012; Rehman et al., 2017). 
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 Operation Sherdil (2008-2009) 
Pakistan army began operations in different places of country after the partial success in southern 
areas of FATA against militants (Khan, Z.A., 2012). The major target of Operation Sherdil was 
to capture the militant‟s organizations, it‟s known as “Battle-of- Bajour” (2008-2009). Over 1000 
terrorists and 63 security personnel had been killed in this fight (PIPS
7
, 2016). 
 Operation Rah-e- Raast (2009) 
Operation Rah-e-Raast launched in Mingora Swat and had aimed to clear most areas of swat and 
arrest or kill main leaders of TTP and other militants. The military successfully completed this 
operation and destroyed hidden explosives, ammunition, confiscated arms and concrete bunkers 
and regained hold on entire Mingora (Khan, Z.A., 2012; Rehman et al., 2017). 
 Operation Rah-e- Nijaat (2009) 
In the center of increasing violence, ground operation was initiated by the Pakistani air force and 
military in South Waziristan, known as Operation Rah-e-Nijaat (Path of Salvation) in 2009 
(Khan, Z.A., 2012; Rehman et al., 2017). Pakistani armed forces conducted “search-and-
clearance” operations beside numerous key roads and places in South Waziristan. They 
successfully disrupted the TTP control and command system in the major Mehsud areas in South 
Waziristan. Hence, the preliminary targets of these operations were to abolish the TTP 
stranglehold in northern and southern areas of Waziristan. These operations were conclusive 
victories of Pakistan military against militants (PIPS, 2016). 
 Operation Brekhna (2009) 
Pakistan military forces launched “Operation Brekhna (meaning Thunder)” against TTP (Tehrik-
i-Taliban Pakistan) in Momand agency (Rehman et al., 2017). It began in 2009 and converted in 
continuing operation “Zarb-e-Azb” in 2014.  
 Operation Khwakh Ba De Sham (2009-2010) 
The counterinsurgency operation against TTP conducted by military in Orakazai agency and 
Kurram agency called operation “Operation Khwakh Ba Da Sham (will teach you a lesson). It 
started in March 2010 and ended in June 2010. However, in September 2009, this operation was 
started in Kurram Agency (Khan, Z.A., 2012; Rehman et al., 2017). 
 Operation Zarb-e-Azb (2014-2017) 
Operation Zarb-e-Azb intended as “eliminating terrorists regardless of the hue and color”. It was 
joint military offensive launched by Pakistan military forces against terrorist in NWA (North 
Waziristan Agency) without any distinction/discrimination of bad or good Taliban (Rehman et 
al., 2017). It is a successful operation and still ongoing in NWA. Operation Zarb-e-Azb 
successfully brings the number of terrorist‟s incidents on minimum level and upgrade the image 
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of Pakistan on worldwide level also strengthens the relationship with bordering countries. Hence, 
it plays a crucial role in reinforce the bilateral ties among China and Pakistan, also bolstering the 
strategic ties in both states to deepened economic collaboration with China in the form of 
“China-Pak Economic Corridor (CPEC)”. 
 Combing Operations (2016) 
Combing Operations has been conducted countrywide to search and eliminate militants, their 
facilitators and sleeper cells.  
 Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad (2017-Onward) 
Pakistan Army launched “Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad” across the country in the start of 2017. 
Operation intends at comprehensively eliminating residual threat of violence and ensuring the 
borders security. Tri Forces of Pakistan military, Law Enforcing Agencies (LEAs) and Civil 
Armed Forces (CAF) will endure to actively contribute to backing the efforts to eradicate the 
menace of violence/terrorism from the country. The efforts involve conduct counter-terrorism 
operation by Ranger in Punjab, continuance of ongoing operations crosswise the country and 
focus on more operative border security supervision. Countrywide explosive control and de-
weaponisation are further cardinals of the efforts. Pursuance of NAP (National Action Plan) is 
the hallmark of operation Radd-ul-Fasaad.  
2. Literature Review 
Dunne et al., (1998) investigated the casual relationship between economic growth and defense 
spending of Turkey and Greece from the time period 1960-1996. For this purpose, they analysed 
data through “pre-cointegration” Granger Casuality test and employed VAR methodology for 
empirical results. The conclusion of their study shows that there is a positive impact of military 
spending on economic growth of Greece but long-run results showing diversity. In contrast, the 
output of  Turkey and military expenditures are not showing cointegration but the casual linkage 
in both varaibles showing negative but significant relationship. Barros (2003) worked on 
terrorism policies made by Spanish Government against terrorism. He used time series data from 
1968 to 2000 for terrorist incidents include kidnapping and assassination, and applied Dickey 
Fuller test with parsimonious VAR model allowed Granger Causality test. The variables of this 
study include Kidnapping, Assassination constructed from ITERATE data set, military 
expenditures from SIPRI dataset, used dummy variables for political powers and used foreign 
investment for economic contribution. Both assassination and kidnapping are stationary 
according to unit rot test so that means Government authorities has overcome on both terrorist 
incident. The effect of deterrence on terrorism is not significant but effect of political powers are 
significant and induce terrorist incidents. Li (2005) analysed various mechanism and modify 
democratic policies which influence transnational terrorsim incident. For this purpose, he used 
data from 1975 to 1997 for the sample of 119 countries by using ITERATE database. He used 
terrorist incident as controlled variable. He used GDP, regime type, income inequality, country 
size, government capability, past incidents, cold war and military conflicts as regressors. He 
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empirically justified his work by using negative binomial regrssion with robust standard error. 
Conclusions of his study shows that democratic involvment decrease terrorist events in a state 
rather than those state whose rulled by mixed system. On the basis of his empirical findings he 
suggested that democratic government can decrease the overall number of incidents within 
borders by satisfying its public and effective political participation rather to limitise press 
freedom, association and movement.  
Drakos and Giannakopoulos (2009) analysed econometric analysis of the impact of 
counter-terrorism effectiveness on life and property losses. For this purpose, they used data on 
transational terrorism from ITERATE dataset (1973-2003). Further they empirically examined 
the Probit Model for finding probabilities for counter-terrorism effectiveness by authorities. They 
used time trend, militery expenditure, regime types, natural log of GDP per capita as control 
variables and used five dummmies denoting the number of terrorist groups and attacks types. 
They also used „incident stopped by authorities‟ as dependent variable and a measure for 
counter-terrorism. The study concluded that probability of  terrorist attack is stopped by 
authorities has increased and relative counter-terrorism effectiveness increased when probability 
of casualities and property losses are diminish. Feridun and Shahbaz (2010) analysed that 
effectiveness of the military authorities is hamper terrorism in Turkey can be estimate. They 
explained their study with ARDL and Granger-Causality analysis with VECM  by using time 
series data from 1986-2006. They obtained data for military defense expenditures from SIPRI, 
percentage of GDP and for terrorism events from MIPI dataset. They concluded their study on 
the basis of hypothsises as an increase in terrorist incident leads to an increase in military 
expenditure to counter-terrorim as expected. On the other hand the other hypothesis is failed to 
capture desired result as an increas in military expenditure leads to decline in terrorist activities. 
Futher they explained that military measures are not just enough to fight against terrorism but 
economic and social measures are also important to have desired results.  
Dongen (2011)  designed counter-terrorism effectiveness through different components 
like number of terrorist attacks, number of victims, material damages and number of arrest. 
According to authors these components may help to contribute in counter-terrorism effectiveness 
and can show whether counter-terrorism policies are doing well or not. He also mentioned that it 
is also necessary to consider and evaluate different separate components of counter-terrorism 
measures. The counterterrorism measures and implementations should be divides into some 
separate elements and that every element of policies leads to effectiveness. Than it will be easy 
to get desire result from that casual chain of separate elements of policies. He introduced a 
simple “social integration program in counterterrorism” to evaluate the causes and effects of 
counterterrorism‟implementation. Rehman et al., (2017) empirically studied the effectiveness of 
different counterinsurgency approaches utilized by Pakistan. They examined that counter-
terrorism strategies can have three impacts, deterrence, breakdown, retalisation. Terrorism wil 
raise if the retaliation effect exceeds the deterrence effect and breakdown impact; if the 
deterrence and breakdown impact are dominant, terrorism will reduce. By utilizing the monthly 
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data for the period 1974m1 to 2015m12, their findings from “negative binomial regression 
model” recommend that “peace accords have no significant impact on terrorism, while military 
operations increment terrorism, proposing the predominance of retaliation impact. Then again, 
operation Zarb-e-Azab, supplemented by the National Action plan, created a solid breakdown 
effect, prompting a significant diminishment in terrorism. Their findings support the idea that a 
viable counter-terrorism policy need a first rate military operation supported by strong political 
help.  
3. Theoretical Framework 
3.1 Potential impact of Terrorist act on Economic growth 
The main short-run objective of terrorist is destabilization of economic growth. Terrorist attacks 
(such as bombing and assassination) are means to attain this short-run objective. Long-run 
political goals (e.g., redistribution of power and wealth) are to be imposed through such 
terrorist attacks. Collier (1999) distinguishes a few channels through which civil war influences 
the economy; Collier's thoughts might be exchanged to terrorism as another type of brutal 
conflict. The channels of exchange from war to the economy are:  devastation, distraction, 
departure, dis-saving and portfolio replacement. Devastation mentions to the immediate costs of 
terrorist acts, as physical and human capital are crushed through psychological militant strikes.  
The distraction impact may, for instance, converted manifest in higher exchange costs, as 
the adequacy of public foundations is challenged and controlled by terror, or as overall 
insecurity rises. Departure happens when public assets are moved from output-enhancing to 
non-beneficial security and defense expenditures. Dissaving indicates to a decrease in 
investment funds that influences the capital stock of economy. Portfolio substitution implies the 
flight of physical, human and budgetary capital from a nation in the face of war. Through every 
one of these impacts financial execution endures, specifically as they may strengthen each 
other. Entomb alia, Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004), Naor (2006) and Mirza and Verdier (2008) 
give related hypothetical considerations that additionally discuss about how terror may act 
contrarily on monetary movement.  
As a rule, terrorism may mutilate the allocation of assets, fundamentally through the 
distraction, departure and portfolio replacement channel. It might likewise adversely impact 
asset accumulation, mainly by means of the devastation and dissaving channel. Blomberg et al., 
(2004) moreover find that assets are moved from speculation to government spending during 
terrorism. Various investigations thus recognize a significant negative impact of terrorist attacks 
on general financial development (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Eckstein and Tsiddon, 2004; 
Crain and Crain, 2006; Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2008). As a rule, existing proof recommends 
that terrorism can destabilize focused on economies. Here, financial movement is influenced 
through different channels, e.g., through the obliteration of national capital stocks, the 
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disturbance of exchange or tourism streams, or the redirection of assets far from private 
speculation, at last bringing about negative development impacts. 
3.2 Potential Impact of Economic Performance on Terrorist act 
Sandler and Enders (2004) argue that militants are rational individuals picking their levels of 
fierce action as indicated by the expenses and advantages emerging from their activities. In view 
of terrorist' assumed objectivity, the terror „opportunity costs likewise matter. Freytag et al., 
(2009) identifies that low opportunity costs of brutality (i.e., few prospects of monetary 
movement) lead to higher terrorism, though high opportunity costs result in the inverse. Times of 
financial achievement mean entomb alia, more individual monetary opportunities and 
investment.  On the other hand, times of financial downturn ought to be joined by less economic 
opportunities and investment and hence by more financial disappointment. Blomberg et al., 
(2004) explained that during the monetary crisis protesters will probably depend on violence as 
the opportunity expenses of terrorism are low, while the potential long-run settlements from 
terrorism (i.e., a redistribution of rare financial assets which is to be authorized by terrorist 
actions) are nearly high.  
To some degree, empirical evidence proposes that economic execution and terror are 
connected along the lines talked about before. The researches of Collier and Hoeffler (1998) 
show that larger amounts of financial advancement correspond with bring down probabilities of 
civil war, giving beginning confirmation that monetary achievement and struggle are oppositely 
contradicted. Considering financial advancement and terrorism, a few investigations find that 
more elevated amounts of improvement are impediments to the creation of terrorist acts (Santos 
Bravo & Mendes Dias, 2006; Lai, 2007; Freytag et al., 2009). Blomberg and Hess (2008) 
likewise find that higher earnings are a solid deterrence to the beginning of domestic terrorism. 
Moreover, Muller and Weede (1990) Freytag et al., (2009) find that there is prove associating 
strong short-run financial conditions with less political viciousness. Here, financial achievement 
appears to hinder the beginning of terrorism, apparently because of higher opportunity expenses 
of conflicts. As it were, during strong monetary execution people just have more to lose. 
3.3 Rational Choice Theory of terrorism and Counter-terrorism 
According to political economists that militants act sensibly for the allocation of their limited 
resources between different targets (Landes, 1978; Sandler et al., 1983; Atkinson et al., 1987). 
To illustrate, the probability of conviction, being killed and apprehension increased by protecting 
a target, it also raises the rate of an attack. The budget constraint of terrorist organization, 
physical and human resources affects when they failed to achieve the target. However, when 
terrorists variate the target from hard-to-soft they make decisions sensibly and strategically. The 
rate and expected marginal benefits would be equates by some sane terrorists among different 
possible targets. Correspondingly, the rate and expected marginal benefits derived from an attack 
would be equates by terrorists in given two different time spans. Proactive measures by 
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government authorities raise the relative cost of current attack that might change current possible 
attack to future periods. When the security level is high, current attack can be more costly than 
future ones. Consequently, the allocation of resources between different times period consider in 
balanced framework to maximize the predictable benefits, given the utility function: 
  ( )    [∑  (  )
 
   ]   U’ (.) > 0, U” (.) < 0    (A) 
Where I1…. It represents terrorist incidence in different time periods given the information 
obtainable. Likewise, a terrorist organization faces an inter-temporal constraint of budget while 
maximizing predicted utility. The inter-temporal constraint of resources of a militant 
organization is following: 
   
  
   
     
  
   
      (B) 
Where R1 shows all resources of terrorist organization (including financial, physical, and 
human) in time span 1, R2 represents the total budget in time span 2. A rational militant 
maximizes equation (A) given the constraint of budget in equation (B). A militant doesn‟t 
utilize all resources in one time span because of maximizing the predicted benefits in two time 
spans.  The higher security level increases the cost of an incidence in period 1 that subsequently 
reduces the predicted marginal benefits of an incidence. Consequently, a tactical terrorist 
organization allocates its resources between different time spans to keep the predicted level of 
least terrorism in each period. For instance, terrorist events in current period (period 1) are 
equal to the organization‟s given capitals plus the reduced value of future (period 2) net 
endowments. The 1
st
 order condition for the maximization problem given in the next equation: 
 (  )   (  )(   )     (C) 
For ease, we consider that the discount and interest rates are equal to 0. Equation (C) can be 
rewrite as: 
 (  )   (  )      (D) 
Where E(u1) and E(u2) the predicted marginal utilities from terrorist attack in current period (1) 
and predicted period (2) respectively. Comprehensive and enhancement of security, including 
counterterrorism operations in present period reduces the predicted marginal utility of terrorist 
attacks comparative to its cost. A rational militant alternates available resources from current 
period (1) to predicted period (2) to satisfy the equation (D) for maintain a least or minimum 
level of terrorism overtime. 
We debate now the deterrence, retaliation and breakdown hypotheses of counter surgery 
operations based on rational choice framework. Proactive measures and polices like military 
operations decrease the terrorist group‟s contributions; from the left-hand side, it decreases R1 or 
R2 of the equation (B). Thus, the constraint of budget either shifts or rotates towards the origin 
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due to such preemptive policies (Rehman et al. 2017). If militant‟s organization assume massive 
losses from anti-terrorism actions of Government, it may reduce the violence in current period 
for the future periods (the deterrence effect). If a terrorist group targeted installations of 
Government without having complete information about the probable response and capacity of 
government, it may face greater loss in resources of organization. If Government reacts 
aggressively, it may lower the predicted attacks in future (the breakdown effect). Lastly, if “Law 
enforcement agencies” take measures without any distinction and discrimination against 
terrorists regardless of their hue and color, it may boost support for the terrorist organization 
which could enhance current attack (the retaliation or backlash effect).  
Likewise, if the selective operations of military authorities relocate militants from one 
area to another, or if the organized terrorist organization has facilitators across country then one 
could suppose backlash attacks in reaction to counter-insurgency of Government. These 
intentions are investigated by using an equilibrium scrutiny of the utility function and budget 
constraint. It is predictable that a militant may alternates attacks overtime conditional on the 
opposing degrees of the deterrence, retaliation and breakdown effect. In short, a rational 
militant‟s group chooses how to distribute attack across changed periods, allocating attacks 
inter-temporally to captivate the shock from proactive and defensive anti-terrorism measures. 
4. Data and Variables Description 
4.1 Dependent Variable 
For regression analysis, this study has included the number of Victims as a response variable for 
capturing the efforts of counter-terrorism (Dongen, 2011). The present study used „fatalities and 
Injured‟ for number of victims in models and constructed these variables from GTD. This study 
also used GDP (per capita) as dependent variable for analyzing the impact of counter-terrorism 
on economic growth of Pakistan. 
4.2 Explanatory Variables 
This paper acknowledges that economic growth, politics and military spending are also strong 
contributors towards fighting against terrorism (Li, 2005). It includes these contributors for 
analysis the impact of counter-terrorism effectiveness on economic growth. The control variables 
count Gross Domestic Product (GDP), regime stability, population size, defense expenditures 
and total attack types. Details and sources of these variables are mentioned as requirement.         
Regime Stability 
 Stability of regime in an independent country must matter to terrorism. The instability in 
political parties and leaderships leads to favorable environment for terrorism (Piazza 2008). 
Khan (2012), Drakos and Giannakopoulos (2009) measured political repression for investigating 
the role of regimes in their analysis. The present study has measured polity variable for regime 
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type and it also helps for measuring authorities „effectiveness. The data has been drawn for 
regime stability from Polity IV Project (Li, 2005). 
Defense Expenditures 
Drakos and Giannakopoulos (2009), Feridun and Shahbaz (2010) investigated “Defense 
expenditure” for measuring the authorities „effectiveness and used it as contributor to counter-
terrorism. They mentioned in their study that authorities' counter-terrorism performance affects 
differently the likelihood of victims and property losses. This study has used defense 
expenditures as a proxy variable for counter-terrorism effectiveness and constructs data from 
Pakistan Economic Surveys.  
Number of Incidence  
Drakos and Giannakopoulos (2009) finds that counter-terrorism efforts made by authorities 
reducing terrorism incidents in country. Dongen (2011) used “number of terrorist attacks” as a 
measure of terrorism score in the country. This analysis accounted for counter-terrorism 
effectiveness, so it used the “number of incidence” to estimate close relationship among counter-
terrorism effectiveness and terrorism. 
GDP (Per capita) 
Firstly, this study included the real GDP per capita as a main indicator and backer of growth. It 
used Gross domestic product (GDP) as the growth variable and compared the GDP of previous 
years with recent decades for investigating the impact of counter-terrorism effectiveness on 
economic growth. Li (2005) explained that terrorist incidents reduce by the economic 
development measured by GDP per capita.  
4.3 Econometric Methodology 
4.3.1 Negative Binomial Regression Model 
For the analytical procedure, this study has used “number of victims” in each period as 
controlled variable against the effort level of Government authorities towards counter-terrorism. 
Here, the study is going to test the significance and magnitude of counter-terrorism effectiveness 
by using “negative binomial regression model”. The terrorist incidents series is based on counts 
so the dependent variable is count variable that allows us to estimate model through Count Data 
Models (Li, 2005). This paper has employed the “Negative Binomial Regression model” by 
following (Li, 2005). The count data models have some assumptions and limitations that based 
on observed, unobserved heterogeneity and dispersion in data.  
The “Poisson regression model” indicates the observed heterogeneity among the observations i, 
so the PRM often use for over-dispersion. The negative binomial approaches to the drawbacks of 
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“Poisson regression model” by adding the parameter β that reveal unobserved heterogeneity 
among predictions Long and Freese (2014), that is, 
 (  |     )        
       
Where term δi = e
γi
 is unobserved heterogeneity and predictor of the independent variables xi. 
The variable Yi dependent on variable Xi and δi is Poisson with dependent mean and dependent 
variance µi δi. 
  (  |     )  
      (    )
  
   
                    (1) 
Let‟s assumed the probability mass function is p (δi). Then the model Pr (yi|xi) is (no longer 
dependent on τi) derived by integrating Pr(yi|xi, δi ) with respect to δi: 
  (  |  )  ∫   (  |     )  (  )   
 
 
      (2) 
The integral stays when δi is consider as going after a gamma distribution. This estimation is 
“Negative Binomial regression model” that have a constant term and it is important to suppose 
that             to explain the mean of the model Cameron and Johansson (1997). Thus, it 
is supposed that δi go after a gamma distribution with Eδi =1 and Varδi= 1/ϑ. 
 (  )  
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      (    )      (3) 
Where,  ( )  ∫     
 
 
   (  )    gamma function and ϑ is a positive parameter. Thus, the 
mass of yi for given xi is estimated as, 
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By making the substitution  
 
 
(   ) , the “Negative Binomial Model” can be revising as; 
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The gamma distribution of “Poisson regression” derived “negative binomial regression model” 
that has a dependent mean, 
 (  |  )   
     
And dependent variance, 
   (  |  )    (  
  
 
)    (     )   (  |  ) 
The dispersion in predictions is obtained by parameter β (Long and Freese, 2014). The dependent 
variance of “Negative binomial model” exceeds the dependent mean. So, there is over-dispersion 
from unobserved heterogeneity. If the mean and variance are equal we have equi-dispersion in 
data, for that researcher employ “Poisson Regression model”. But if the variance exceeds the 
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mean, there is over-dispersion in data we need to use “Negative Binomial Regression Models” 
Cameron and Johansson (1997). 
4.3.1.1 Over-dispersion Test 
The “Negative Binomial regression” command count ln (α) so the null hypothesis is, 
H0: ln (α) = 0 
The alternative hypothesis is, 
H1: ln (α) ≠ 0 
The requirement of significance for test is α ≥ 0 and the sampling distribution will be normal for 
α = 0 because values have a 0 probability when they are less than 0. The log likelihood-ratio 
(LR) test for H0: α = 0 i.e. mentioned below the parameters‟ estimation of NBR model (1). 
Likelihood-ratio test of alpha=0:  chibar2 (01) = 9809.80 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.000 
 
The test statistics “chibar2 (01)” is estimated as, 
G2 = 2 (ln LNBRM – ln LPRM) 
= 2 (- 270.901 – (-5175.802)) = 9809.80 
The log likelihood for the “Poisson Regression model” (ln LPRM) is use from the iteration „Fitting 
Poisson Model‟ and the log likelihood for “negative binomial regression model” (ln LNRBM) is 
from the end of the final iteration. There is strong and significant evidence for over-dispersion 
(G
2 = 827.71, p < 0.000, so the “negative binomial regression model” (NBRM) is preferred over 
the “Poisson Regression model” (PRM). The log likelihood ratio is not shown for robust 
standard error option because robust standard error has computed in NBRM by simply if there is 
over-dispersion Long and Freese (2014). 
4.3.1.2 Robustness Test 
 When variance specification is misspecified in the model, standard errors are 
downwardly biased in presence of over-dispersion, so it is recommended that with the “negative 
binomial regression model” (NRBM) this study can use the robust standard error Cameron and 
Trivedi (2013). The “negative binomial model” can perfectly estimate the predicted probabilities 
in the presence of over-dispersion. When the study uses robust standard errors, the “negative 
binomial regression” is robust to explain distributional misspecification Cameron and Trivedi 
(2013). 
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4.3.1.3 Interpretation using IRR 
 The “incidents rate ratio” (IRR) is an equation for the NBRM using for interpreting the 
change in predicted count by the predictors Long and Freese (2006). The linear combination of 
explanatory variables predicts the log of count variables. 
   (                 )                                      
This implies, 
                     (                                  )
    (  )     (     )     (     )     (        ) 
The leading interpretation is that a change of β in xk, the predicted counts exceeds by a factor 
change of exp (βk*α) keeping other variables same Long and Freese (2006). The estimated 
coefficients in log(y) have an “additive effect” and the IRR explained the “multiplicative effect” 
in the y. The expected counts do not effect by the dispersion parameter “alpha” in NBRM but 
estimated variance does effect by the “alpha” Long and Freese (2006). 
4.3.1.4 Interpretation using Marginal Effects and Predicted Probabilities 
In the “negative binomial regression model” with the presence of over-dispersion, the 
predicted probabilities can differ substantially and the predicted rates are same Long and Freese 
(2006). For this, the method for interpreting predicted probabilities is same as we computed 
probabilities for “negative binomial regression model”, 
  (  |  )  
 (    
  )
    (   )
(
   
      
) 
  
 (
  
      
 )   
Where,  
µ = exp (xα) 
By using „predict‟ we can estimate predicted probabilities for observed values of explanatory 
variables. Predicted Probabilities can be computed using margins or marginal effects. Marginal 
effects or margins can estimate the change in a predicted size as an explanatory variable change, 
keeping other variables constant Long and Freese (2006). The marginal effects can estimate 
prediction. The dy/dx (varlist) is denoted for the list of independent variables for those changes 
are computed, hence dy/dy (*) shows that changes for all explanatory variables are to be 
estimated. The marginal effects compute the marginal change that is the partial derivative with 
respect to a given variables, keeping other variables constant. 
4.3.2 An Econometric Analysis of Counter-terrorism and Economic Growth 
This approach has adopted to empirically check out the relationship among counter-terrorism 
efforts and economic growth by using Cointegration technique for long-run and short run 
relationship, also we are using causality test for economic growth and measures against the 
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terrorism (Barros, 2003). If there is integration in two series the Granger Causality must be 
present in at least unidirectional (Engle and Granger, 1987). The first step has been taken to 
construct the integration assumption of our series through “Augmented-Dickey Fuller (ADF) 
test”. If all series have a same level of integration i.e. I (1), then might be the series have long-
run relationship. The second step has been taken to find long-run and short-run relationship by 
using “ARDL bound test” and VECM for separating long-run and short-run coefficients. The last 
step entails to build the “Granger-causality test” enlarge with a suitable error term. These steps 
have been taken to pre-test strategy to construct whether causality occur earlier to specifying the 
direction via level Granger-test (Dunne et al, 1998). 
4.3.2.1 Testing for Unit-root 
This paper begins empirical analysis by using ADF test for establishing the assumption of 
integration for Gross Domestic Product (GDP), number of incidents, Polity (regime type), and 
defense expenditures. For granger causality test, series must be integrated at order one denoted 
as I (1) Asteriou (2015). So, we employ ADF test to check the stationarity of series. The ADF 
methodology includes additional lagged terms of controlled variables to remove 
autocorrelation. The lag length criteria for additional terms is either check through AIC and 
SBC or more appropriately by the needed lag length to check the residual Asteriou (2015). 
The three feasible types of the ADF test are mention in following equations: 
                 ∑        
 
                           (1) 
                   ∑   
 
              (2) 
                      ∑   
 
             (3) 
Where, 
   (  ∑  
 
   
) 
    ∑  
 
   
 
The coefficient of attention is β, if β=0 the equation is integrated at order 1, so it has unit root 
Enders (2004). Again, the variation between above three regressions prior to existence of these 
δ0 and δ2t components. The critical values of the ADF test take from MacKinnon (1991). 
4.3.2.2 ARDL Bound test  
Econometric writing has abundant econometric procedures to research co-integration 
connection among macroeconomic factors. Be that as it may, with regards to the present 
investigation, the ARDL way to deal with cointegration (Pesaran et al., 2001) is chosen as it 
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performs preferred in small sample sizes over other cointegration procedures. Furthermore, it is 
applicable independent of whether the fundamental regressors are simply I(0), absolutely I(1) or 
commonly cointegrated. The statistics underlying this system is the commonplace Wald or F-
statistics in a summed up Dickey– Fuller type regression, which is utilized to test the significance 
of lagged levels of the variables under thought in a conditional unrestricted equilibrium "error 
correction model(ECM) (Pesaran et al., 2001). 
The ARDL approach includes estimating the conditional error correction version of the ARDL 
model for the variable under estimation. The Augmented ARDL (p, q1, q2,…, qk) is given by 
the following equation (Pesaran et al., 2001): 
 (   )      ∑  (   )   
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Where, 
 (   )           
       
  
  (    )              
         
                            
yt is dependent variable, β is the constant term, l is the lag operator such that lyt = yt – 1, wt is the 
s × 1 vector of deterministic variables such as intercept term, exogenous variables with fixed 
lags. The long-term elasticities are measured by: 
   
 ̂ (   ̂)
 (   ̂)
 
 ̂    ̂      ̂  ̂
   ̂   ̂     ̂ 
                           ( ) 
Where   ̂      ̂  , i = 1, 2, ..…, k are the selected (estimated) values of   ̂      ̂  , i = 1, 2, .…, 
k. The long run coefficients are estimated by: 
  
  ̂(  ̂  ̂   ̂     ̂ )
   ̂   ̂        ̂ 
                      ( ) 
Where    ̂(  ̂  ̂   ̂     ̂ )  denotes the OLS estimates of    ̂ in equation (1) for the selected 
ARDL model. 
The ARDL approach includes two stages for evaluating the long run relationship (Pesaran et al., 
2001). The initial step is to research the presence of the long run relationship among all factors in 
the equation under estimation. The ARDL model measure (p + 1)k, the number of regression so 
as to get optimal lag length for every variable, where p is the maximum number of lag to be 
utilized and k is the number of variable in the equation. The second step is to measure the long 
run and short run bi-causal relationship of the fundamental variable. We run the second step just 
on the off chance that we estimate a long run relationship in the initial step (Narayan and Smyth, 
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2005). This study utilizes a more broad type of ECM with unrestricted intercept and no trends 
(Pesaran et al., 2001): 
                        ∑   
        
       
   
   
             ( ) 
Where c0 ≠ 0 and c1 = 0. The “Wald test” (F-statistics) for the null hypothesis are: 
  
           
  
             
and alternative hypothesis are: 
  
           
  
           
  
Hence, the combined null hypothesis of the concern in the above equation is given by: 
      
      
      
and the alternative hypothesis is respectively stated as: 
      
      
      
In the present study, the existence of a long-run relationship between counter-terrorism and 
economic growth investigated in the form of the unrestricted error correction model for each 
variable as follows: 
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Where, GDP representing economic growth, however DEXP, Victims, NOI, and Polity are 
components of counter-terrorism. On the flip side     is error term in the model. The first part of 
both equations with α1, α2, α3, α4 α5 represents the short-run dynamics of the model, whereas the 
second part with α6, α7, α8, α9, α10 represents the long-run phenomenon. The null hypothesis in 
equation (5) is α6 = α7 = α8 = α9 = α10 = 0 which means the non-existence of the long run 
relationship and vice versa.  
The ARDL model testing technique starts with directing the bounds test for the null hypothesis 
of no cointegration. The calculated F-statistic is related with the critical bound values. Hence, 
specified the sample size used in the present study, the estimated ARDL test statistics are also 
compared with the respective critical value bounds reported in model. If the F-test statistic 
exceeds the upper critical value, the null hypothesis of no long-run relationship can be rejected 
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regardless of whether the fundamental orders of integration of the variables are I(0) or I(1). 
Similarly, if the F-test statistic falls below the lower critical value, the null hypothesis is not 
rejected. However, if the sample F-test statistic falls between these two bounds, the result is 
inconclusive. When the order of integration of the variables is known and all the variables are 
I(1), the decision is made based on the upper bounds. Likewise, if all the variables are I(0), then 
the decision is made based on the lower bounds. The model can be selected using the lag length 
criteria like Akaike information criterion, Schwartz-Bayesian Criteria (SBC) and Hannan-Quinn 
(HQ) information criterion. 
4.3.2.3 Granger Causality test  
  The third stage includes accompanying standard “Granger causality test” augmented with 
a lagged error-correction term. “Granger Causality test” is often used to check the causal 
relationship among variables. The Granger representation theorem recommends that there will be 
Granger causality in at least one direction if there occur a co-integration relationship among the 
variables offers the variables are integrated order of one. Engle and Granger (1987) cautioned 
that if the Granger causality test is conducted at first difference through the vector auto 
regression (VAR) method then it will be misleading in the presence of co-integration.  Therefore, 
a presence of an additional variable to the VAR method such as the error correction term would 
help us to capture the long-run relationship.  
The Granger (1969) model provides a bivariate VAR model that is used in this study to 
empirically test the causal relationship between counter-terrorism measures and economic 
growth.  
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      (7) 
The null hypothesis for this test can be formalize as equation (7) is “X does not granger-causes 
y” or “y does not granger causes x”. 
Ho: γi = 0,  i = 1, 2, 3,…, m    
Ho: γj = 0,  j = 1, 2, 3,...., n    
And the alternative hypotheses can we written as follows, 
H1: γi ≠ 0,               i = 1, 2, 3, ..., m 
H1: γj ≠ 0,    j = 1, 2, 3, ..., n 
It‟s may appear that test provides us some amazing results when we count the definitions of 
granger causality (1980). We should include an exogenous variable when testing the granger 
causality. Assume that Government is trying to control and targeting an economic indicator yt, its 
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desired value is at and the expected square of the difference between at and yt is cost function 
(Granger, 1988). 
Suppose the government has controlled the variable xt and yt is derived from following equation, 
we have, 
                      (8) 
 Let the predicted variable is Xt, refers as wt-1= xt and it is also belonging to time in which it is 
estimated, εt is white-noise zero mean.  
                       (9) 
       
  (       )    (10) 
                  (11) 
Where, 
       
  (         )        
The interpretation will be incorrect if equation (10) would explained by an economic theory that 
wt-1 must be causes by yt. From the perspective of government in this case wt-1 does not causing 
yt. Equation (11) contained the information that yt and at is exactly explaining wt (Granger, 
1988). 
The “vector error correction model” is stated as follows: 
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Where α1, α2, α3 α4 and α5 are the short-run dynamic coefficients of the model‟s convergence to 
equilibrium and α is the speed of adjustment. Through the ECT, the VECM offer new directions 
for Granger causality to appear. Long-run causality can be exposed through the significance of 
the lagged ECTs by a t- test, while the F-statistic or Wald test examine short-run causality over 
the significance of joint test with an application of the sum of lags of explanatory variables in the 
model. 
5. Empirical Results and Discussion 
5.1 Findings of Negative Binomial Regression model 
The “negative binomial regression model” provides the results for a concerned objective 
of pioneering study based on the significance and magnitude of counter-terrorism effectiveness. 
The finding of this study stands for the raw evidence that proactive measures for combating 
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terrorism are working or not. Perhaps the scholarly counter-terrorism research pays a bit 
attention to when and how counter-terrorism yields the needed results (Lum et al., (2006).  
5.1.1 Statistical Description 
It‟s always a better idea to begin with plots and statistical description. The statistical 
description of the annual number of victims given in table (5.1). The distribution of dependent 
variable seems much responsible. The statistical description of count variable shows that the 
conditional mean is very lower than the conditional variance of variable. Hence, the assumption 
of “negative binomial regression model” is completely fulfilled as the conditional variance is 
exceeds than the conditional mean of count variables, so it suggests for using the “negative 
binomial regression model” for count dependent variable (Rehman et al., 2017).  
Table (5.1) Statistical Description for Annual number of Victims 
Time Period Total Victims Mean St.Dev. Min Max 
1980-2015 55072 1529.7 1951.52 0 7631 
1980-2000 10225 486.9 435.06 0 1286 
2001-2015  44847 2989.8 2309.8 300 7631 
2006-2015 42349 4234.9 1760.6 965 7631 
 
Graph (5.1) Histogram for Number of Victims 
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Table 5.2: Negative Binomial Regression Model for No. of Victims 
Variables Estimated 
Coefficients 
Standard 
Errors 
(Robust) 
IRR p-
values 
Marginal 
Effects 
GDP (per capita) -0.0795 0.0629 0.9235 0.207 0.445 
Polity (Regime Type) 0.0749 0.0331 1.0778 0.024 0.032 
Defense Expenditures -0.2909 0.1498 0.7475 0.052 0.010 
No. of Incidence 0.0006 
 
0.0003 1.0006 0.063 0.134 
Lnalpha -0.2051 0.3281 - - - 
Alpha 0.8145 0.2672 - - - 
         Likelihood-ratio test of alpha=0:  chibar2 (01) = 9809.80 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.000 
5.1.2 Analysis of Counter-Terrorism Effectiveness 
The estimation of “negative binomial regression model” mentioned in table (5.2) and it 
appropriately fulfilled the hypothesis of our study. In this part, we present sensitivity analysis for 
assessing the robustness of our findings. The degree of increasing or decreasing number of 
victims conditioned on different counter-terrorism measures.  
Table (5.2) indicates the empirical findings for the counter-terrorism achievements based on the 
results. The GDP (per capita) is estimate of “negative binomial regression”; the coefficient of 
GDP is negative but insignificant. It indicates that income has no impact on terrorism and 
counter-terrorism measures in Pakistan. Moreover, religious, ethnic and political indicators can 
affect the terrorism and counter-terrorism measures in the country. The marginal effect indicates 
that probability of number of victims for GDP (per capita) is increase by 44.5 percentage points 
(Drakos and Giannakopoulos, 2009). For counter-terrorism measures, economy is an indirect and 
not good indicator to interpret effectiveness (Dongen, 2011).  
Polity is also positive and significant explanatory variable of model indicates that 
unstable democratic participation can increase the expected number of terrorist attacks by 0.0749 
percent. The marginal effect for polity, the probability of number of causalities increase by 3.2 
percentage points. Countries with stable regimes experience fewer terrorist incidents than those 
countries which are not politically stable (Li, 2005). The positive relationship between terrorism 
and polity is due to political instability (Piazza, 2006).  
The coefficient of defense expenditures is negative and significant. The estimated 
coefficient of defense expenditures shows that one unit increase in military expenditures over 
GDP, holding other variables of model constant. If defense expenditures increase by the one unit, 
the probability of reducing terrorist incidents at the annual rate increased by 0.2909 percent. The 
marginal effect indicates that defense expenditures are positively correlated with higher 
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probability of number of victims, a result that is contrast to estimated coefficient (Drakos and 
Giannakopoulos, 2009). Military actions and proactive efforts in a backlash of terrorist activities 
can exceed the deadly terrorist attacks as beef (Rosendorff and Sandler, 2004). The incident rate 
ratio (IRR) shows that one unit increase in defense expenditures can decrease the terrorist attacks 
by factor 0.7475. This estimation is raw evidence of effectiveness level of military authorities 
and counter-terrorism seems much more effective as compared to terrorism. The deterrence 
effect is measured by the defense expenditures and result shows its dominants on retaliation 
effect. 
The estimated coefficient of number of incidence is positive but significant. The 
increasing number of incidents shows the retaliation effects. The marginal effect for number of 
incidence shows that the probability for number of victims increases by 13.4 percentage points 
(Drakos and Giannakopoulos, 2009). An increase in the total terrorist attacks is not a definitive 
indication that counter-terrorism measures are not working well. The severity in terrorist 
incidents can be the result of radicalization which shows the psychological level of new terrorist 
group. The reinforce one type of attack would exceeds the other types of attacks and this 
intensity of terrorist campaign might be dangerous for terrorist organizations (Dongen, 2011). 
The estimation shows that if a unit increases in number of terrorist attacks can increase the 
number of victims by 0.0006 units. The defensive efforts of military authorities can move the 
attention of terrorist organizations from hard targets to soft targets e.g. increasing number of 
victims (Dongen, 2011).  
5.2 Analysis of Economic Growth and Counter-Terrorism 
5.2.1 Results of Unit Root 
Table (5.3) Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test 
 
Variables 
Level 
Intercept 
 
Trend & Intercept 
1st Difference 
Intercept   
 
Trend & Intercept 
 
Decision  
NOI -0.6079 
(0.8505) 
-1.2639 
(0.8714) 
-2.7003 
(0.086) 
1.9607 
(1.000) 
Non-stationary at I(0) but 
Stationary at I(1) 
D.Exp 0.7340 
(0.9912) 
-2.1075 
(0.5239) 
-7.502 
(0.0000) 
-7.953 
(0.0000) 
Non-stationary at I(0) but 
Stationary at I(1) 
Polity -1.703 
(0.4207) 
-1.6885 
(0.7351) 
-5.4334 
(0.0001) 
-5.359 
(0.0006) 
Non-stationary at I(0) but 
Stationary at I(1) 
GDPPC -4.1122 
(0.0029) 
-3.4439 
(0.0205) 
-7.3855 
(0.0000) 
-7.3755 
(0.0000) 
Stationary at I(0) but also 
Stationary at I(1)  
NOV -1.3878 
(0.5770) 
-2.3647 
(0.3904) 
-5.4029 
(0.0001) 
-5.4526 
(0.0005) 
Non-stationary at I(0) but 
Stationary at I(1) 
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Through appropriate unit root test (ADF) this study checked the stationarity of all variables. The 
tabulated t-values compared to the calculated t-value. The results of ADF test shows that all 
variables of counter-terrorism measures and economic growth are stationary at I(0) level 
(intercept, trend and intercept). But they some of them became stationary after taking first 
difference I(1). Further, the results of ADF test fulfilled the assumption of integration for 
Cointegration test and Casualty test that all variables are stationary at 1
st
 difference. The studies 
of Anwar et al., (2012) and Malik and Zaman (2013) are supportive in this regard. 
5.2.2 ARDL Bound test approach to Long-run Relationship 
The results of the ARDL bounds testing approach to long run relationship are reported in 
Table (5.4). The findings of the short run dynamic coefficients related with the long-run 
relationships attained from the equation (5) are given in Table (5.4). The results recommend the 
rejection of the null hypothesis of no long-run relationship at the 5% level of statistical 
significance when GDP is treated as the dependent variable. As can be seen from the table, the 
estimated F-statistic is greater than the upper bound critical values given in the model at 5% and 
2.5 % level of significance. This finding shows the presence of a long-run relationship between 
economic growth and counter-terrorism when the latter is treated as the independent variable. 
 Table 5.4 ARDL (2, 1, 1, 1, 1) Model selected based on AIC   
Variables Coefficients t-statistics Probability 
GDPPC(-1) 0.537305 2.734864 0.0124 
GDPPC(-2) -0.395676 -2.086367 0.0493 
DEXP 2.099998 2.544974 0.0188 
DEXP(-1) -2.506513 -2.564155 0.0181 
NOI 0.001306 0.718168 0.4806 
NOI(-1) 0.002380 1.730423 0.0982 
VICTIMS -0.000373 -0.973704 0.3413 
VICTIMS(-1) -0.001061 -2.428897 0.0242 
POLITY 0.225236 2.221435 0.0374 
POLITY(-1) -0.199338 -2.331539 0.0298 
C 4.933134 2.528442 0.0195 
ECT (-1) -0.858370 -4.520831 0.0002 
F-statistics 4.857081   
 
Table 5.5 Critical Value Bounds 
Significance I0 Bound I1 Bound 
10% 2.45 3.52 
5% 2.86 4.01 
2.5% 3.25 4.49 
1% 3.74 5.06 
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The coefficient on the lagged error-correction term (ECT) is significant at 1% level with the 
negative sign, which approves the result of the bounds test for cointegration. Its value is 
estimated to -0.85 which suggests that the speed of adjustment to equilibrium is high. 
Approximately, this model is getting adjusted at the speed of 85% converge to the long-run 
equilibrium. In the long run D.Exp, Victims, NOI and Polity Granger cause GDP. This result 
suggests that causality runs cooperatively through the error-correction term from D.Exp, 
Victims, NOI and Polity to GDP. In the short run, only defense expenditure and polity are 
significant at 5% level and has an important impact on GDP. Economic growth and Victims have 
a negative impact but not significant. The impact of NOI is positive but not significant. 
5.2.2.1 Diagnostic Test 
The regression for the fundamental ARDL equation (5) fits very well and the model is globally 
significant at 5% level and 2.5%. It also passes the diagnostic test against serial correlation 
(Durbin Watson test and Breusch-Godfrey test). 
Table 5.6 Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test 
F-statistic 0.962566     Prob. F(2,19) 0.3998 
Obs*R-squared 2.944031 Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.2295 
 
The p-values is only approximate, but they strongly suggest that there is no evidence of serial 
correlation in the model's residuals. 
5.2.2.2 Parameter Stability Test 
The presence of cointegration between economic growth and counter-terrorism measures does 
not necessary indicate that the valued coefficients are stable. If the coefficients are not stable the 
results will be possibly biased. For testing the long-run parameter stability, Pesaran and Pesaran 
(1997) recommend applying the “cumulative sum of recursive residuals” (CUSUM) and the 
“CUSUM of square” (CUSUMSQ) tests to the residuals of the estimated error correction models. 
The benefit of these tests is that, unlike the Chow test that entails break point(s) to be identified, 
they can be used without the condition of a priori information of the structural break point. The 
associated null hypothesis is that all coefficients are stable.  
The CUSUM test practices the “cumulative sum of recursive residuals” created on the first 
observations and is reorganized recursively and plotted beside break point. The test is more 
suitable for noticing systematic variations in the regression coefficients. The CUSUMSQ makes 
by using the squared recursive residuals and follows the same process. However, it is more 
valuable in situations where the exit from the constancy of the regression coefficients is random 
and sudden. If the plot of the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ stays in the 5% critical bounds of the null 
hypothesis that all coefficients are stable cannot be rejected. If, conversely, either of the parallel 
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lines are crossed then the null hypothesis of parameter stability is rejected at the 5% significance 
level. 
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Graph (5.2) Plot of cumulative sum of recursive residuals  
Note: The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance levels 
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Graph (5.3) Plot of cumulative sum of squares of recursive residuals  
Note: The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level. 
Graph 5.2 and 5.3 shows the results of the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ, respectively. As can be 
seen, the results show the absence of any instability of the parameters because the plot of the 
CUSUM and CUSUMSQ statistic lie within the critical bands of the 5% confidence interval of 
parameter stability. 
5.2.3 Causality between Counter-terrorism and Economic Growth 
The presence of long-run relationship between the underhand variables connoted that the 
Granger Causality must exist at least in one direction. Therefore, the study conducts the bi-
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variate “Granger Causality test" for variables of economic growth and variables of counter-
terrorism by following the sequence of variables in ARDL model. For Granger Causality, if the 
F-statistics is 4 and p-value is lower than 0.05 than we reject Ho (Anwar et al., 2012).  
Table (5.7) Results of Granger Causality test  
 F –statistics  
Dependent 
Variables 
 
 (GDPPC) 
 
D(DEXP) 
 
D(NOI) 
 
D(Victims) 
 
D(Polity) 
Direction of 
Causality 
D(GDPPC) - 2.49 4.85 3.93* 5.93 
NOI → GDPpc 
Victims → GDPpc 
Polity → GDPpc 
D(DEXP) 3.00** - 0.75 0.36 5.21 
Polity →D.Exp 
GDPPC →DEXP 
D(NOI) 2.43 2.56 - 9.77 2.19 Victims→ NOI 
D(Victims) 1.72 1.81 3.21** - 1.56 NOI → Victims 
D(Polity) 2.98** 0.39 0.53 0.14 - GDPpc → Polity 
(*) and (**) denote statistical significance at the 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Table (5.7) indicates the results for the causal relationship between economic growth and 
counter-terrorism measures. Results shows that NOI does Granger cause GDPPC, Victims does 
Granger cause GDPPC, it means there is uni-directional causal relationship between these 
variables. Polity does Granger cause GDPPC and GDPPC does Granger cause Polity that means 
there is bi-directional causality exist. GDPPC does Granger cause DEXP. Polity does Granger 
cause DEXP but DEXP does not Granger cause Polity, implies that unidirectional causality 
occurs between Polity and DEXP (Malik and Zaman, 2013). However, NOI does Granger cause 
Victims and Victims does Granger cause NOI which implies the bi-directional causal 
relationship between NOI and Victims.  
6. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
6.1 Conclusions 
This study aimed to investigate the impact of counter-terrorism effectiveness on economic 
growth.  Due to lack of most essential and appropriate data for the analysis of counter-terrorism 
polices on public databases, the present study has used different components of terrorism events 
that may help to contribute in counter-terrorism effectiveness. The results of those components 
shows when and how counter-terrorism policies yield the desired results. For this purpose, we 
constructed data on terrorism events from “Global Terrorism Database” (GTD) for the period 
1980-2015 and employed data for economic growth from “World Development Indicators” 
(WDI). 
This paper examined the policies and struggles of Government and military authorities for 
combating terrorism in Pakistan. The strategies we discussed here includes Deterrence effect 
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which explained through peace accords and agreements, Retaliation effect that showed the effort 
level of terrorist organizations and Breakdown effect which explained the incapacitation of 
terrorist organization by following civilian polices and military operations. 
The study empirical test the magnitude and significance of counter-terrorism effectiveness 
through “negative binomial regression model” (NBRM). The estimation is raw evidence of 
effectiveness level of military authorities and counter-terrorism seems much more effective as 
compared to terrorism. The deterrence effect is measured by the defense expenditures and result 
shows it dominants on retaliation effect. The findings show that defensive efforts of military 
authorities can move the attention of terrorist organizations from hard targets to soft targets and 
increase the number of victims and more deadly terrorist attacks as gripes. The result implies that 
counter-terrorism policies and strategies may not be able to restrict violence and incapacitate 
militant‟s organization if it lacks solid political support. 
On the flip side, this paper has developed econometric models for ARDL Bound testing and 
causality analysis for checking the relationship between counter-terrorism effectiveness and 
economic growth. It empirically checked the cointegration for long run as well as short-run 
relationship exists between economic growth and counter-terrorism efforts. The results also show 
that there are short term and also long term impacts of counter-terrorism effectiveness on 
economic growth of Pakistan, but strong counterinsurgency strategies can lead to long term 
impacts in future. 
In 2015, Pakistan recorded a considerable drop in terrorism with 45 % less assaults and 38 % less 
deaths than in the earlier year (U.S Country Report on Terrorism 2016). This is the second back 
to back year in which Pakistan has seen a diminishment in terrorism. Terrorism in the nation is 
currently at its most reduced levels since 2006. Be that as it may, with 1,086 victims, Pakistan is 
yet the 6th deadliest nation. The diminishment in death from terrorism is to a limited extent 
clarified by Operation Zarb-e-Azb by the Pakistan Army which began in mid-2014. This 
concentrated on expelling activist places of refuge in the North Waziristan locale of the FATA 
(Global Terrorism Index, 2016). The results show the significant backlash or breakdown effect 
of proactive measures, exclusively military operations, by law enforcement agencies and 
departments. 
6.2 Policy Implications 
The results of present study indicate that the retaliation effect can dominate deterrence effect 
because deterrence effect is short-lived and weak strategy that may useful for crimes. Hence, it‟s 
important to plan a strongest counter surgery policy such as NIPS and NAP that leads to 
strongest breakdown effect. The results also suggest that more essential steps are needed to be 
taken which based on NAP and NIPS for debilitate the terrorist organization around the country. 
Furthermore, military operations and civilian policies extraordinary need public and political 
support in the country. Therefore, military and Government establishment should reinforce their 
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synchronization by completely implementing NIPS and all 20 points of NAP to permanently 
eliminate terrorism.  
This study evaluated various counter-terrorism policies based on theoretical and empirical 
analysis. In this contribution, the present study suggests that increase the material expenses of 
terrorist attacks through armed punishments, increase the target protection from terrorist attacks, 
raise the opportunity cost of terrorist attacks through deterrence, concessions and target 
hardening. These strategies may establish more effective results towards combating terrorism 
both in long-run and short-run period. Still, it is probable that direct nation actions by the 
intelligence, military and police services may backﬁre and make huge second-order effects.        
The present study also suggests that research work should be spread out in future through the 
availability of time series data of counterterrorism policies so that it will be easier to enhance the 
research on deterrence, retaliation and breakdown effects of counterterrorism activities. From the 
literature review, it is also recommend for the accessibility of essential data on security measures 
towards counter-terrorism includes; military operations, number of arrested terrorists, number of 
terrorist attacks stopped by authorities and deployment of security.  
7.  References 
Abadie, A.  and J.  Gardeazabal (2008).  "Terrorism and the world economy." European 
Economic Review 52(1): 1-27. 
 
Anwar, M. A., Z. Rafique, et al. (2012). "Defense spending-economic growth nexus: A case 
study of Pakistan." Pakistan Economic and Social Review: 163-182. 
 
Atkinson, S. E., T. Sandler, et al. (1987). "Terrorism in a bargaining framework." the Journal of 
Law and Economics 30(1): 1-21 
 
Barros, C. P. (2003). "An intervention analysis of terrorism: The Spanish ETA case." Defence 
and Peace Economics 14(6): 401-412. 
 
Barth, J. R., T. Li, et al. (2006). "Economic impacts of global terrorism: from Munich to Bali." 
 
Blomberg, S. B., G. D. Hess, et al. (2002). Terrorism from within: An economic model of 
terrorism, Working paper series//Claremont Institute for Economic Policy Studies. 
 
32 
 
Bravo, A. B. S. and C. M. M. Dias (2006). "An empirical analysis of terrorism: Deprivation, 
Islamism and geopolitical factors." Defence and Peace Economics 17(4): 329-341. 
 
Collier, P. and A. Hoeffler (1998). "On economic causes of civil war." Oxford economic papers 
50(4): 563-573. 
 
Collier, P. (1999). "On the economic consequences of civil war." Oxford economic papers 51(1): 
168-183. 
 
Country Report on Terrorism (CRT), 2016. https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2016/ 
 
Crain, N. V. and W. M. Crain (2006). "Terrorized economies." Public Choice 128(1): 317-349. 
 
Crenshaw, M. (1981). "The causes of terrorism." Comparative politics 13(4): 379-399. 
 
Drakos, K. and N. Giannakopoulos (2009). "An econometric analysis of counterterrorism 
effectiveness: the impact on life and property losses." Public Choice 139(1): 135-151. 
 
Dunne, P., E. Nikolaidou, et al. (2001). "Defence spending and economic growth: a causal 
analysis for Greece and Turkey." Defence and Peace Economics 12(1): 5-26. 
 
Eckstein, Z. and D. Tsiddon (2004). "Macroeconomic consequences of terror: theory and the 
case of Israel." Journal of Monetary Economics 51(5): 971-1002. 
 
Enders, W. and T. Sandler (1993). "The effectiveness of antiterrorism policies: A vector-
autoregression-intervention analysis." American Political Science Review 87(4): 829-844. 
 
Feridun, M. and M. Shahbaz (2010). "Fighting terrorism: are military measures effective? 
Empirical evidence from Turkey." Defence and Peace Economics 21(2): 193-205. 
 
33 
 
Freytag, A., J. J. Krüger, et al. (2010). The origins of terrorism: Cross-country estimates on 
socio-economic determinants of terrorism, Economics of Security Working Paper. 
 
Freytag, A., J. J. Krüger, et al. (2011). "The origins of terrorism: Cross-country estimates of 
socio-economic determinants of terrorism." European Journal of Political Economy 27: S5-S16. 
 
Gaibulloev, K. and T. Sandler (2008). "Growth consequences of terrorism in Western Europe." 
Kyklos 61(3): 411-424. 
 
Gaibulloev, K., T. Sandler, et al. (2013). "Reevaluating terrorism and economic growth: dynamic 
panel analysis and cross-sectional dependence." 
 
Global Terrorism Database (GTD), 2015. https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/  
 
Global Terrorism Index (GTI), 2012. http://economicsandpeace.org/reports/  
 
Global Terrorism Index (GTI), 2015. http://economicsandpeace.org/reports/  
 
Global Terrorism Index (GTI), 2016. http://economicsandpeace.org/reports/   
 
Granger, C. W. (1969). "Investigating causal relations by econometric models and cross-spectral 
methods." Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society: 424-438. 
 
Gries, T., T. Krieger, et al. (2011). "Causal linkages between domestic terrorism and economic 
growth." Defence and Peace Economics 22(5): 493-508. 
 
Hyder, S., N. Akram, et al. (2015). "Impact of terrorism on economic development in Pakistan." 
Pakistan Business Review 839: 704-722. 
 
Khan, A., M. A. R. Estrada, et al. (2016). "How terrorism affects the economic performance? 
The case of Pakistan." Quality & Quantity 50(2): 867-883. 
34 
 
 
Khan, H. (2012). Determinantsof Terrorism in Pakistan: A Time Serie Analysis. 
 
Khan, Z. A. (2012). "Military operations in FATA and PATA: implications for Pakistan." 
Strategic Studies 31: 136-145. 
 
Landes, W. M. (1978). "An economic study of US aircraft hijacking, 1961-1976." the Journal of 
Law and Economics 21(1): 1-31. 
 
Lai, B. (2007). "“Draining the swamp”: an empirical examination of the production of 
international terrorism, 1968–1998." Conflict Management and Peace Science 24(4): 297-310. 
 
Li, Q. (2005). "Does democracy promote or reduce transnational terrorist incidents?" Journal of 
Conflict resolution 49(2): 278-297. 
 
Long, J. S. and J. Freese (2006). Regression models for categorical dependent variables using 
Stata, Stata press. 
 
Lum, C., L. W. Kennedy, et al. (2006). "Are counter-terrorism strategies effective? The results of 
the Campbell systematic review on counter-terrorism evaluation research." Journal of 
Experimental Criminology 2(4): 489-516. 
 
Malik, Z. and K. Zaman (2013). "Macroeconomic consequences of terrorism in Pakistan." 
Journal of Policy Modeling 35(6): 1103-1123. 
 
Mehmood, S. (2014). "Terrorism and the macroeconomy: Evidence from Pakistan." Defence and 
Peace Economics 25(5): 509-534. 
 
Mirza, D. and T. Verdier (2008). "International trade, security and transnational terrorism: 
Theory and a survey of empirics." Journal of Comparative Economics 36(2): 179-194. 
 
35 
 
Mirza, D. and T. Verdier (2008). "International trade, security and transnational terrorism: 
Theory and a survey of empirics." Journal of Comparative Economics 36(2): 179-194. 
 
Muller, E. N. and E. Weede (1990). "Cross-national variation in political violence: A rational 
action approach." Journal of Conflict resolution 34(4): 624-651. 
 
Naor 1, Z. (2006). "Untimely death, the value of certain lifetime and macroeconomic dynamics." 
Defence and Peace Economics 17(4): 343-359. 
 
Pesaran, M. H. and B. Pesaran (1997). Working with Microfit 4.0: interactive econometric 
analysis, Oxford University Press. 
 
Pesaran, M. H., Y. Shin, et al. (2001). "Bounds testing approaches to the analysis of level 
relationships." Journal of applied econometrics 16(3): 289-326. 
 
Piazza, J. A. (2008). "Incubators of terror: Do failed and failing states promote transnational 
terrorism?" International Studies Quarterly 52(3): 469-488. 
 
Rehman, F. U., M. Nasir, et al. (2017). "What have we learned? Assessing the effectiveness of 
counterterrorism strategies in Pakistan." Economic Modelling 
 
Sandler, T. and W. Enders (2008). "Economic consequences of terrorism in developed and 
developing countries." Terrorism, economic development, and political openness 17. 
 
Schneider, F., T. Brück, et al. (2015). "The economics of counterterrorism: A survey." Journal of 
Economic Surveys 29(1): 131-157. 
 
Van Dongen, T. W. (2011). "Break it down: An alternative approach to measuring effectiveness 
in counterterrorism." Journal of Applied Security Research 6(3): 357-371. 
 
36 
 
Wang, S., Q. Li, et al. (2016). "The relationship between economic growth, energy consumption, 
and CO 2 emissions: empirical evidence from China." Science of the Total Environment 542: 
360-371. 
 
 
 
 
 
